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Abstract: 
In this paper we focus on understanding the rapid rise of the Chinese PV industry and its profound impact 
on the global PV industry. We investigate how it is possible that a nation that is still focusing on catching up 
in terms of industry, innovation and technology has been able to bring manufacturers from leading 
engineering nations to their knees. This paper applies the framework of the Technological Innovation 
System (TIS), and also takes the context into account, in terms of the Chinese national innovation system 
(NIS) and the global PV TIS. It concludes that the rise of the Chinese PV TIS can be explained by the 
interaction of three context factors (the change in Chinese institutions, technology transfer, and the large 
European market) and specific PV TIS dynamics. The study empirically shows the importance of extending 
the national TIS studies by including the influences of context factors.  
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1. Introduction 
The market for solar photovoltaics (PV) is growing rapidly. In the past decade, solar PV generation has 
expanded by 50% per year worldwide. In 2012, solar PV generation reached almost 100 TWh, which is 
sufficient to cover the annual power supply needs of over 30 million European households. In the same 
year, the world’s cumulative total installed capacity exceeded 100 GW, up from only 1 GW in the year 2000 
[1, 2].  
 
This rapid market growth is mainly due to a massive reduction in production costs [3]. For example, the 
inflation-adjusted prices of crystalline-silicon (c-Si) PV modules have fallen from 5.0 USD/watt in 2000 to 
around 0.6 USD/watt in June 2014 [4, 5]. This sharp drop in production costs has mainly been caused by 
process innovations in manufacturing technology [1], such as improvements in wire cutting technology. In 
addition, mass production has led to more efficient and cheaper solar cell production machinery. PV 
production lines have been optimized, for example by developments in intelligent and self-correcting 
control of process flow, and this has increased throughput volume. Furthermore, the efficiency of solar cells 
and modules has increased, resulting in higher returns on investments [6]. 
 
Lower prices are good for consumers and for governments that use financial instruments to support the 
adoption of PV technology. However, the PV industry is severely struggling, as many companies cannot 
make sufficient profits due to the low market prices. Specifically since 2011, some major global PV 
manufactures have suffered a sharp decrease in self-financing, including First Solar (USA), Kyocera (Japan) 
and Trina Solar (China) [7]. Moreover, some large global PV companies have gone bankrupt, including PV 
manufacturer Suntech (China) and PV panel producers Ever-green Solar and Solyndra (USA), as well as Q-
Cells and Solon (Germany) [8-11]. 
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This industry shake-out had a typical geographical pattern. In 2002, Japan became the world leader in PV 
manufacturing, with four companies in the top 10 largest PV manufacturers in terms of solar cell sales. In 
2007, the German PV company Q-Cells took over first place, while the number of Japanese PV companies 
in the top 10 fell to three. From 2010, Chinese firms took over the top position at the cost of Japanese and 
German players [6]. In 2012, of the top 10 solar PV manufacturers in terms of actual production/shipments, 
seven were Chinese companies, and there were no longer any Japanese or German companies in the top 
10 [12-15]. This shake-out is a typical pattern in emerging industries. The literature on industrial dynamics 
has empirically shown that in many emerging industries the number of firms increases at first, but that a 
shake-out occurs when process innovations instead of product innovations start to dominate the innovation 
direction of the industry [16-19]. However, in the case of the PV industry, which is heavily supported by 
government policies, this industry shake-out posed serious legitimacy questions regarding government 
support of the PV industry. More specifically, Germany’s renewable energy policy was criticized for not 
delivering the vibrant industry that was hoped for. Subsequently, the blame for these losses was put on 
China and this eventually led to EU trade restrictions on PV from China [20].  
 
The influence of Chinese PV manufacturing on the structure of the global industry is noteworthy. In general, 
Chinese industrial activities have replaced western production capacity in the past 20 years, due to low 
resource costs, including labor, land use and electricity, abundant human and material resources, and 
potentially massive markets. However, but it is for the first time that Chinese industrial activities have had 
such a profound impact on a high-tech and emerging sector.  
 
In recent years, there has been a sharp increase in the number of studies into Chinese PV technology, 
industry and policy, and these studies have uncovered some major factors contributing to the rapid rise of 
the Chinese PV industry. The great demand of global markets is believed to be one of the most important 
factors. Zhang et al. (2013) showed that the Chinese solar PV industry has been influenced greatly by 
overseas markets, for example in European countries such as Germany [21]. Another important factor is 
the active role of the Chinese government, with its various policy tools. Zhang et al. (2013) found that 
China’s top policy objective is to develop the emerging renewable energy industry, aiming to shift from a 
low-cost manufacturing-based economy to a more high-tech, high-value-added, innovative economy [21]. 
Similarly, Zhao et al. (2011, 2013) showed that the Chinese government aims to play a vital role in fostering 
an environment that promotes the development of the PV power industry [22, 23].  
 
In addition, a necessary factor seems to be the innovation and development of PV power technology. Zhao 
et al. (2013) showed that China’s PV power technology has improved dramatically, with technological 
advances in the efficiency, reliability, and reduced pollution of PV cells and PV power generation systems, 
leading to a rapid increase in both PV production capacity and the value of exports [22]. China seems to be 
at the industrial forefront of innovative PV production technology. However, it is as yet unknown how this 
process occurred. Zheng & Kammen (2014) and Grau et al. (2013) both reported that Chinese PV 
manufacturers tend to have lower R&D intensity than the PV manufacturers in other major countries. 
Current investment in Chinese PV is mainly focused on manufacturing and application rather than on R&D 
[5, 24]. This conclusion is in line with the findings of Lei et al. (2013) and Wu & Mathews (2012), both based 
on the USPTO (United States Patent and Trademark Office) data [25, 26]. In addition, De la Tour et al. (2011) 
stated that the success of some Chinese PV manufacturers cannot be attributed to innovation [27].  
 
Thus, even though several experts have studied the rise of the Chinese PV industry and a few factors have 
been singled out that to explain the current dominance, we lack insight into the mechanisms that explain 
the emergence of the Chinese PV industry. Also there is still a debate on the role of domestic innovation in 
explaining the rapid rise of Chinese PV industry. In this article we therefore present a detailed historical 
review of the rise of the Chinese PV industry in relation to the context in which this industry emerged. For 
this purpose, we adopt the innovation system since this perspective allows us to analyse the complex nature 
of industry emergence and highlights the collective nature of innovation and the interdependencies 
between actors and institutions in the development and deployment of innovation [28]. Since we focus 
specifically on the innovation system around the Chinese PV technology and the Chinese PV industry we 
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adopt the Technological Innovation Systems (TIS) framework [29]. To create insight into the mechanisms 
that explain the successful emergence of the Chinese PV industry we use a process method approach [30-
32]. 
 
We also contribute to the conceptual development of the TIS perspective by explicitly differentiating the 
Chinese PV TIS and the context in which the innovation is embedded. We discern the international PV 
innovation system and the Chinese National Innovation System as context systems. By explicitly 
conceptualizing the context of an innovation system we answer to the call of Truffer & Coenen (2012) for a 
better spatially conceptualized TIS analysis and the suggestions of Bergek et al. (2015) to conceptualize 
different context systems of a TIS [33, 34].  
2. Methodology 
2.1. TIS and its contexts 
TIS approach views innovation as a collective activity and analyses how innovations are developed and 
deployed through the complex interactions among a multitude of different actors and organizations that 
are enabled and constrained by physical artifacts as well as by institutions that are regarded as ‘the rules of 
the game’. The TIS perspective has often been applied to describe and analyze the emergence of radical 
innovations [34-37]. Many of the studies have focused on sustainable energy technologies in various 
countries around the world [35, 38-40], and many apply the scheme of analysis suggested by Bergek et al. 
(2008). This scheme suggests that analysts should create insight into the structure of the innovation system 
(the network of actors, institutions and physical infrastructure) and complement these insights by focusing 
on the key processes that take place in the innovation system [29]. Hekkert et al. (2007) propose the 
following key processes: entrepreneurial experimentation, knowledge development, knowledge exchange, 
guidance of the search, market formation, resources mobilization, and creation of legitimacy (the seven 
system functions) [28]. The focus on key processes or functions complements the analysis of the structure 
of innovation systems since many different structural configurations may lead to a similar performance of 
the innovation system. The analysis of key processes sheds light on how an innovation system is performing. 
Weak system functions require attention by actors who have an interest in improving the functioning of the 
innovation system.  
 
A cause of weak system functions can be found in other system functions. Suurs et al (2009) have shown 
that innovation systems have properties similar to complex systems and that positive feedback loops 
between system functions are not only responsible for speeding up system performance but also for 
slowing down it [45]. It is important to note that system functions do not interact directly: they interact via 
the actors in the innovation systems. An example of a positive feedback loop can be found in the following 
situation: when actors express high expectations about an innovation, other actors are more likely to make 
resources available for this innovation, and this makes it easier for entrepreneurs to obtain access to 
resources and to increase their innovation activities. At the system functions level, there is a positive 
feedback loop between guidance of the search, resources mobilization and entrepreneurial 
experimentation. Similarly, negative interaction or lack of interaction explains why certain system functions 
are not fulfilled well. 
 
Even though interaction patterns can explain system performance, for system interventions it is necessary 
to find the deeper causes for a lack of positive feedback loops or the presence of negative feedback loops. 
Different authors label these deep causes as systemic problems [42], system failures [43], or blocking 
mechanisms [44]. These causes are mostly found in the structure of the innovation system, but they may 
also be outside the innovation system (see Weber and Rohracher (2011) for an elaborate overview of these 
systemic problems [43]). An abundance of cases has shown that the framework is well suited to analyze the 
emergence of both radical innovations and industries as well as to investigate the reason why more mature 
innovation systems function as they do [35, 45, 46].  
 
However, the framework is also criticized. An important criticism is the often national focus in TIS studies. 
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A Technological Innovation System is a global system, but still many studies delineate the TIS to the border 
of a specific country, e.g. Biofuels and Solar PV in the USA [47], Micro-CHP in the UK [48], Biomass Digestion 
in Germany [35], Fuel Cells in Sweden [49], and CCS in China [50]. This national delineation is justified by 
the argument that many institutions that influence an innovation system are of a national character and 
that national governments often have a specific interest in accelerating specific technological trajectories. 
Truffer & Coenen (2012) have discussed the problems with national delineation. They believe that the 
research on TIS overemphasizes the national level at the expense of other geographical levels. A specific 
socio-technical regime structure is always embedded in wider institutional context conditions and political 
economies, and regimes may therefore be subject to spatially differentiated transformation trajectories. 
This is why they suggest taking more account of the geographical information surrounding the TIS. 
Moreover, the current TIS literature has yet been able to explicitly address the globalization of technology 
development and diffusion [51], while the geography of emerging technologies may exhibit highly 
distributed spatial patterns of development, such as the technological leapfrogging potentials in emerging 
economies [52]. To adjust for this spatial blindness, Truffer & Coenen (2012) believe that the role of the 
global network needs to be considered [34].  
 
In line with the suggestions of Truffer & Coenen (2012), we have explicitly taken the context of the Chinese 
PV TIS into account. We did this by studying the general institutional and politico-economic context of 
China, illustrated by the concept of the Chinese National Innovation System (Chinese NIS), as well as the 
role of the global PV production and consumption, illustrated by the concept of Global PV TIS. Theoretically, 
the Chinese PV TIS forms part of the Chinese NIS and Global PV TIS, while the Chinese NIS plays only a 
marginal role in the Global PV TIS since PV is only a small sector in the Chinese economy (see Fig. 1). At the 
bottom of Figure 1, we have included a category of exogenous factors that are not part of either the Chinese 
NIS or the Global PV TIS; still, these factors clearly influence PV developments in China.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Chinese PV TIS and its context  
2.2. Material and methods 
Qualitative analysis has mostly been used in recent empirical work concerning system functions. This 
method is strongly based on the results from interviews. The set of system functions mainly serves as a way 
to structure empirical material (see [45, 53]). However, interviews generally only lead to information on a 
limited number of key events that are subject to recall problems of the interviewees and are therefore less 
suited to construct the history of an emerging innovation system. An alternative method is historical event 
analysis, which has been applied in TIS studies, e.g. Negro et al. (2007) [54]. This method strongly builds on 
the work on process analysis as deployed in the Minnesota Studies by Van de Ven et al. (1999)[55]. 
Fundamentally, this approach consists of retrieving as many historical events related to a technological 
development as possible, based on professional journals, newspapers and websites. The events are stored 
in a database, classified and systematically allocated to the seven system functions. Functional patterns can 
then be extracted from the database. The methodology results in a coherent sequence of events and trends 
that describe how things have changed over time [54]. The events in this study are retrieved from Chinese 
professional journals on PV and renewable energy, including Solar Energy, Energy of China, Energy 
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Engineering, Renewable Energy Resources, Applied Energy Technology and Energy Research and 
Information. ‘PV’ and ‘photovoltaic’ have been used as keywords in the title or abstract of each of these 
journals from 1985 to 2012, since 1985 is the year in which all six journals became available online. As a 
result, 1,348 articles are selected, from which the events are extracted. These are supplemented by Chinese 
newspapers and Chinese websites.  
 
When depicted in graphs, all events are weighted the same, but in the historical narrative the importance 
of events are indicated. In addition, a distinction should be made regarding the nature of the contribution 
of an event to the fulfilment of a function. Some events contribute negatively to the development of the 
technology, and these are counted separately and are represented as negative scores. The negative and 
positive scores are not added, since the difference between the negative and positive components 
describes the debate that is going on (see Table 1 for the indicators). In the event analysis, we focused on 
the rise and fall of the number of activities over time and on the occurrence of interactions between system 
functions. However, the event data did not always provide enough information to make statements 
whether a system function is fulfilled sufficiently or not. We added interviews to obtain expert statements 
on this issue so that the evaluation of system functions is not based solely on the event analysis. Also the 
interviews were used to shed light on causal links between system functions, which were not apparent from 
the event analysis. In other words, sometimes the event analysis showed a rise in events or appearance of 
events that we could not explain. We questioned experts in those specific areas where the problematic 
interpretation of the event analysis occurred. Appendix A presents further information on the interviewees, 
in which the names of interviewees are not provided due to confidentiality reasons. We interviewed eight 
people in prominent academic and industry positions. We highlighted the system functions by referring to 
the system functions number F1, F2, etc., adding a C when the event can be considered as part of the 
Chinese PV TIS and a G when the event takes place outside China and is part of the Global PV TIS.  
 
Table 1  
Description and indicators for ‘Functions of Innovation Systems’ 
Function  Indicator Sign/value 
Function 1:  
entrepreneurial activities 




Function 2:  
knowledge development 
Domestic R&D projects, investment in R&D, desktop/ 
assessment/feasibility studies on PV production 
Training or R&D projects started through turn-key production 
line/machinery/patent import 
+1 
Function 3:  
knowledge diffusion 
Domestic workshops, conferences 
Joint research projects, subsidiary of transnational companies,  
international conferences or seminars 
+1 
Function 4:  
guidance of the search 
Positive expectations on PV  
Explicit regulations by government 
Negative expectations on PV  




Function 5:  
market formation 
Specific favorable tax regimes and environmental standards  




Function 6:  
resources mobilization 
Subsidies, investments for PV  
PV streams allocated to project 
Expressed lack of subsidies, investments 




Function 7:  
advocacy coalition 
/creation of legitimacy 
Support by government, industry  
Expressed lack of support by government, industry 
+1 
-1 
Sources: [54, 56-58] 
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3. Empirical results: the rise of the Chinese PV innovation system 
3.1. The beginning 
PV in China can be dated back to 1958, when the first piece of silicon single crystal was invented by the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS). Subsequently, the new Institute of Semiconductors, a subdivision of 
the CAS, started researching solar cells [59]. In 1968, the first solar cells aimed at uses in space satellites 
were successfully developed and manufactured by an institute in Tianjin; they were installed on China’s 
second satellite, Practice I, in 1971. In the 1970s, a few factories in the cities of Shanghai, Ningbo and 
Kaifeng produced solar cells for satellites; these factories were operated by the government [22]. It is 
believed that at the time there was hardly any difference between the efficiency of the solar cells developed 
in China and of those developed in western countries [60]. In 1973, PV started to be used on land as the 
energy source for the beacon light in Tianjin port. In subsequent years, some PV demonstration projects 
were set up for military communication systems, systems for the protection of petroleum pipelines, 
microwave relay stations, water pumps, and rural broadcasting stations [61, 62]. 
3.2. 1985-1996: The pioneering era  
In the early 1980s, the economy of China, a socialist country, was dominated by public ownership of 
businesses; officially, privately-owned entrepreneurial activity was not permitted. It was not until 1987 that 
the National People's Congress (NPC) affirmed for the first time that the private economy was part of the 
socialist economy [63]. In the following year, the Interim Regulations on Private Companies was established 
by the Central People’s Government (CPG), aiming to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of 
privately-owned companies. Since then, privately-owned entrepreneurial activity in China has officially 
been allowed and even encouraged in certain sectors, including the manufacture and generation of PV [64]. 
This institutional reform is external to the Chinese PV TIS but has had a major influence on the rise of the 
Chinese PV industry.  
 
From 1979 to 1992, eight PV companies and research institutes owned by the Chinese government [C-F3] 
purchased from US and Canadian firms (including Spire and TPK) [G-F3] several turn-key production lines 
as well as manufacturing equipment for c-Si solar cells (first generation solar PV), a-Si solar cells (second 
generation solar PV), polycrystalline silicon, and amorphous silicon  [65]. Several of our interviewees 
believed that at that time China lacked the ability to design and manufacture turn-key production lines and 
manufacturing equipments for the mass production of both c-Si and a-Si solar cells. One interviewee 
claimed that the technology import hardly had any influence on China’s ability to produce PV technology, 
but merely served as a means to train a group of people destined to become key technical staff members 
[C-F6] of newly-established PV companies in the following years [66, 67]. In the 1990s, besides the import 
of technology, the only activity was the emergence of a few PV companies [C-F1] based on technology 
developed at Chinese universities [C-F2]. For example, Jinglong Amorphous Silicon Factory was established 
in Hebei province in 1995, and this factory was the starting point of the Jinglong Group1 [68]. 
 
In 1992, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was established to 
"stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system" [69]. After this event, the Chinese CPG proposed to 
optimize the relationship between environment and development, by explicitly mentioning solar power 
and other renewable energy technologies [C-F4]. In 1995, the ‘New Energy and Renewable Energy 
Development Outline for China (1996-2010)’ [70] was drafted by the National Scientific and Technological 
Commission (NSTC). This Outline was aimed at coordinating economic growth and environment protection, 
especially for rural areas. It was the first time that the concept of renewable energy had been singled out 
in a national document. The document put forward a development plan for PV in the following five years 
and highlighted the development of PV cell modules and PV machinery. Moreover, the diffusion of small-
scale PV systems and PV demonstration power stations had been highlighted. In 1996, the Electric Power 
                                                             
1 The Jinglong Group, founded in 1995, is a Chinese manufacturer of photovoltaic products. In 2005, JA Solar Holdings was 
set up as a subsidiary of Jinglong Group, which in 2007 was publicly listed on the National Association of Securities Dealers 
Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) (http://www.jinglong.net/). 
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Act was issued, and this law explicitly mentioned “encouraging and supporting the application of renewable 
energy and the generation of clean energy” [C-F4] [71]. 
 
Thus the pioneering era was characterized both by permitting private enterprise and later by specific 
guidance by the Chinese government. This led to the import of foreign technology [G-F3], followed by 
entrepreneurial activities by mostly state-owned PV manufacturers [C-F1], made possible by the 
information gained from using the production technologies [C-F2]. In addition, the increased global 
guidance in low carbon solutions influenced the guidance by the central government with respect to solar 
power and other renewable energy technologies [C-F4] (see Fig. 2). 
 
 
Fig. 2. The main functional pattern of the Chinese PV innovation system in the period 1985-1996 
 
3.3. 1997-2003: Opening up of the economy and start of privately-owned entrepreneurial activities  
The beginning of this period is characterized by the Kyoto Protocol that imposed binding obligations on 
industrialized countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and explicitly proposed the development and 
use of renewable energy [G-F4], leading to several governmental programs of PV application in the USA, EU 
and Japan from 1997 onwards [G-F4]. Triggered by the potentially huge foreign market, Chinese 
entrepreneur Jifan Gao believed that renewable energy would in the long run substitute fossil energy, in 
order to meet the energy needs and emission reduction goals [72]. With this in mind, he set up Trina Solar2 
in 1999 [C-F1]. This was one of the first privately-owned PV companies in China, and it developed the first 
building powered by solar PV in China [C-F2]. One of the interviewees from a Chinese PV company stated 
that the first privately-owned PV companies mainly relied on previous capital accumulation by 
entrepreneurs [C-F6] rather than investments by the government or capital market [73]. 
 
In 1999, renewable energy was included as one of the 107 key fields prioritized by the Chinese government 
in the ‘Guide to High-tech Industrialization: Key Fields of Current Priority’ [C-F7], which also prioritized the 
industrialization of PV cells [74]. The results of this plan were less than impressive: there appeared to have 
been only one investment [C-F6], namely by the company Yingli Green Energy3 for purchasing a complete 
                                                             
2 Trina Solar is a Chinese manufacturer of photovoltaic modules; it was founded in 1997 as a system installation company. 
Trina Solar is currently one of the few photovoltaics manufacturers that have developed a vertically integrated supply chain 
from the production of monocrystalline ingots, wafers, and cells to the assembly of high quality modules. Trina Solar 
successfully completed its initial public offering on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in December 2006 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trina_Solar). 
3 Yingli Green Energy, established in 1998 by Liansheng Miao, is a solar energy company and photovoltaic (PV) 
manufacturer. Yingli Green Energy completed its IPO on NYSE in June 2007. Nowadays, Yingli Green Energy has a balanced 
vertically integrated production capacity of 2,450 MW per year (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yingli). 
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set of advanced PV machines and technologies from abroad [G-F3], so as to build three production lines [C-
F1] for the production of polycrystalline silicon wafers, polycrystalline silicon solar cells, and solar cell 
modules [75]. 
 
At the end of 2001, China officially became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). This proved 
to be a great accelerator for the Chinese PV industry. As a WTO member, China could gain easier access to 
foreign open markets and products made in China were no longer subject to foreign trade barriers. Baofang 
Le, chairman of the board of the Jinglong Group, stated that “before joining the WTO, as a Chinese PV 
company, we always ran into trade barriers everywhere, leading to very high transaction costs” [76]. 
Xiaofeng Peng, the initiator of LDK Solar4, founded in 2005 [C-F1], even stated that “if China had not become 
a member of the WTO, there would have been no market for our PV products and I might not have founded 
LDK Solar” [C-F4] [77]. As an export-oriented sector, the Chinese PV manufacturing experienced significant 
stimulating effects from the opening up of the Chinese economy [78]. 
 
From 2001 onwards, the Chinese government also specifically highlighted the importance of PV technology. 
In the ‘Plan for New Energy and Renewable Energy Industry Development in the Tenth Five-Year (2001-
2005)’ [79], renewable energy was regarded as an important solution to optimize the energy structure and 
to reduce the impact on the environment [C-F7]. Furthermore, PV technology was included in the three 
most significant national research programs in China during 2000 to 2001 [80], namely the ‘National Basic 
Research Program of China (973 Program)’, the ‘National High Technology Research and Development 
Program of China (863 Program)’, and the ‘Plan of National Key Science and Technology (2001-2005)’. The 
first two national research programs were regarded as guidelines for the development of national strategic 
key technologies in China [81, 82]. Triggered by this strong guidance, investment in the R&D of PV [C-F6] 
increased faster than before in 2002, followed by more R&D projects [C-F2] focusing on PV (see Fig. 3). In 
2002, there was a rapid increase in the number of papers that resulted from externally funded research 
projects at universities, illustrating the increased investment in PV research. In 2003, there was again an 
increase in the number of organizations conducting research on PV, and this most likely was the result of 
the greater availability of funding for PV R&D. Moreover, US patents granted to China [C-F2] began to 
increase in 2003 [26], indicating a bolstering of the local knowledge development in China. However, 
entrepreneurial activities were not greatly influenced by this strengthening of the knowledge infrastructure 
(see Fig. 4), since the cooperation between companies and universities or research institutes was still weak. 
This was illustrated by the low proportion of co-authored papers conducted by companies in cooperation 
with universities or research institutes. Several of our interviewees stated that there was a wide gap 
between academic R&D related to new PV and the application of this knowledge by PV manufacturers in 
China. This was mainly due to the architecture of the Chinese scientific research system that is strongly 
knowledge-oriented rather than product-oriented [60, 66, 67, 73].  
 
                                                             
4 LDK Solar, located in the city of Xin Yu, was founded by Xiaofeng Peng in July 2005. It manufactures polysilicon, mono and 
multicrystalline ingots, wafers, cells, modules, systems, power projects, and solutions. On June 1st, 2007, LDK was 
successfully listed on the NYSE, financiering 0.486 billion USD, thus becoming the largest IPO of the new energy industry 




Fig. 3. Knowledge development regarding PV from the journal Acta Energiae Solaris Sinica 
 
 
Fig. 4. Entrepreneurial activities and knowledge development regarding PV from six professional journals 
about energy in China  
 
In 2002, the interaction between foreign PV producers and China started to increase. There were several 
international aid projects focusing on the application of PV in China. For example, the China-Germany 
Western PV Village Program was the largest project on PV in China aided by a foreign country thus far. In 
this project, Germany planned to provide non-reimbursable assistance of about 34 million USD [G-F6], and 
this assistance involved PV systems and capital [83, 84]. The reason for this interest in China was the high 
expectations about the size of the Chinese domestic PV market. Western countries began to explore the 
Chinese PV market by offering capital and technological support, aiming to sell more PV products, PV 
production lines, and knowledge (mainly in the form of patent licensing), as well as obtain contracts for PV 
installation [85]. Germany even supplemented an 8 million USD investment in the 2.8 MW Qinghai PV 
Power Station Project in 2002 [86]. That same year saw a peak in the investment in PV by the Chinese 
government. The ‘Delivering Electricity to the Countryside Program’ was established; this program covered 
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783 rural villages which until then had no access to electricity (off-grid) in the provinces of Tibet, Xinjiang, 
Qinghai, Gansu, Shaanxi, Inner Mongolia, and Sichuan. The program included small-scale hydropower, PV 
generation and wind-solar hybrid power systems. The expected total investment was 1.8 billion CNY (about 
0.2 billion USD)5, and the expected total installed capacity was 12 MW [87-89]. However, considering the 
huge energy demand in China and in comparison with other renewable energy technologies, the home 
market for PV was still very small [73]. Foreign firms and governments was overly optimistic about the 
potential of the Chinese PV market.  
 
To summarize, in this period the privately-owned entrepreneurial activity in the manufacturing sector [C-
F1] began to increase, triggered by the guidance from international organizations and several pioneering 
countries on PV [G-F4], the opening up of the Chinese economy in relation to the WTO, as well as the high 
expectations of PV [C-F4]. The increased legitimacy of PV [C-F7] resulted in more resources [C-F6]. These 
resources triggered the import of technology [C-F3], which in turn led to learning from the use of the 
production technologies [C-F2] in newly-established privately-owned PV production set-ups [C-F1]. The 
strengthening of guidance [C-F4] in this period also led to knowledge creation [C-F2]; however, this was not 
closely related to privately-owned entrepreneurial activities [C-F1]. Moreover, the application of PV [C-F1] 




Fig. 5. The main functional pattern of the Chinese PV innovation system in the period 1997-2003 
3.4. 2004-2008: Boost of the PV manufacturing sector triggered by the European market 
In 2004, a new amended version of Germany’s Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) came into force, 
replacing the previous version from the year 2000. This act gave priority to electricity generated from 
renewable energy sources, guaranteeing each plant operator a fixed tariff for electricity that was generated 
from renewable sources and fed into the public electricity grid [G-F5] [90]. In addition, some other 
European countries initiated policies that stimulated the demand for PV. These developments strongly 
increased the demand for PV products. There was a very strong correlation between the growth rate of 
European PV installed capacity and the Chinese PV cell production output (see Fig. 6), which clearly 
indicates that the expanding European PV market was the main driver for the growth of the Chinese PV 
manufacturing sector. The European subsidy regimes, especially in Germany and Italy, attracted many 
Chinese companies to enter into the PV manufacturing sector [C-F1] by purchasing turn-key production 
lines from western countries to produce PV cells, even though they had no previous experience in the PV 
manufacturing sector [66, 85]. Thus, it was the plug-and-play character of solar cell manufacturing that 
enabled Chinese manufacturers to move in quickly.  
 
                                                             
5 We use the USD to CNY exchange rate of the year to make these conversions in this paper. In 2002, the exchange rate for 




Fig. 6. Comparison of the growth rate of Chinese PV cell production output and European PV installation 
capacity from 2000 to 2012 (MWp) 
Source: [2, 91, 92] 
 
Due to the strong increase in demand for PV, a global shortage of high purity polycrystalline silicon occurred 
in 2004 [85]. Especially in the Chinese PV cell manufacturing sector, there was consensus that the factories 
in possession of silicon were the key players in the field [66, 67]. As a result of the shortage, the price of 
high purity polycrystalline silicon rose to about 300 USD/kg in 2007, while the production cost was just 
about 25-35 USD/kg [93]. Not surprisingly, this led to a huge increase in entrepreneurial activity in the 
polycrystalline silicon manufacturing sector [C-F1]. However, since the purity requirement of solar grade 
polycrystalline silicon is much higher than for computer chips, hardly any company in China was able to 
manufacture solar grade polycrystalline silicon before 2007, and this led to a greatly increased import of 
technology [G-F3]. For example, silicon company ORISI Silicon purchased an in-house pilot line from Russia 
and started producing, even though the line was not mature enough. Moreover, a large number of technical 
staff in this field were recruited with high salaries from the seven major global silicon companies6 [C-F6] 
[66].  
 
However, it seems that the development of the competence in PV machinery design and manufacturing did 
not come from technology import, but from the R&D development of the Chinese machinery 
manufacturers. Several interviewees noted that Chinese machinery manufacturers from the semiconductor 
industry had a good technological background, which allowed for quick adjustment to manufacturing PV 
machinery for c-Si solar cells [67, 73]. Therefore, it was the close connection between the knowledge 
necessary for PV manufacturing technology and the knowledge necessary for the semiconductor industry 
that facilitated this rapid Chinese involvement.  
 
In 2005, the ‘Renewable Energy Act’ was issued in China, which demanded compulsory grid connection and 
full purchase of renewable power [C-F7] [94]. This law triggered local governments to support PV firms in 
their region [67]. For example, the newly-established PV company LDK Solar was founded as a result of 
strong support from local government. In 1997, the initiator of LDK Solar, Xiaofeng Peng, started Suzhou 
Liouxin to manufacture personal protective equipment products such as gloves. He considered moving into 
PV production [C-F1] when he realized that the European PV market was highly promising. In the meantime, 
the mayor of the city of Xin Yu, Dehe Wang, was looking for investments in renewable energy. As a result, 
LDK Solar was established in Xin Yu in 2005, with strong support in the form of financial resources, human 
resources and cheap power supply, provided by the local government of Xin Yu [C-F6], [67].  
                                                             




Late in 2005, Suntech Power became the first PV manufacturer to be listed in the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) [G-F6], which indicates that by then Chinese PV manufacturing was also able to obtain investment 
from the global capital market. This proved to be a strong driver for other PV manufacturers and 
entrepreneurs in China [95, 96]. In addition, the promising European PV market also led to more local 
capital resources allocated to the PV manufacturing sector [C-F6] [73]. As a result, with easy access to global 
and local capital resources, most PV cell manufacturers purchased production lines from western countries 
[G-F3], ironically mainly from Germany, to produce PV cells and to export them back to Europe. One of our 
interviewees stated that in this period German machinery was favoured for its greater stability and 
reliability. This machinery outperformed the much cheaper Chinese machinery, whose frequent repairs led 
to production stops and thus to higher production costs [66]. Due to the generally high profitability of solar 
cells, it took less than one year for manufacturers to earn back their investment in production lines, which 
was much shorter than the payback times in any other sector [66, 67]. It is fair to say that Chinese PV 
manufacturers began to enter the global market with the advantage of lower production costs compared 
to other nations. According to the 2007 report on PV in China, published by the China Renewable Energy 
Industry Association, the costs of a 1 kW solar system for 2006 were between 3.7 CNY/kWh (0.46  USD/kWh) 
and 5.5 CNY/kWh (0.69 USD/kWh). A leading Chinese PV manufacturer even estimated that the cost of 
smaller scale PV could be lower at 2.1 CNY/kWh (0.26 USD/kWh). In the meantime, the estimated cost in 
Europe was up to roughly 0.75 EUR/kWh (0.94 USD/kWh) [92]. Following abundant global and local 
investment and strong support from local governments, entrepreneurial activities in the PV manufacturing 
sector remained very active in 2005 [C-F1], even though the growth of the European PV installed capacity 
dropped dramatically (see Fig. 5). Under these circumstances, there was a huge shortage of trained staff 
for PV, since the speed of domestic personnel training was lagging far behind the expansion of the Chinese 
PV manufacturing sector. At the time, Chinese PV manufacturers were vying for Chinese PhD graduates in 
solar cell technology from foreign universities. Local PhD graduates in solar cell technology could also easily 
earn formidable salaries of about 500,000 CNY per year (about 61,000 USD) [66].  
 
In the meantime, a lobby emerged for new policy programs stimulating local demand for PV. There was a 
call for an explicit national target for PV, and for financial incentives to stimulate a National PV market [C-
F7] [98]. In 2006, the following three detailed regulations were drafted: the ‘Special Renewable Energy 
Fund’, the ‘Regulation of Renewable Energy Generation, and the ‘Renewable Energy Price and Cost-Sharing 
Management’ [44]. However, compared to the explicit regulations on the price of wind power generation 
and biomass generation, a clear regulation on the price of PV generation was still missing. As a result, 
installed capacity increased to 20 MW in 2007, an increase which was dwarfed by the PV cell production 
capacity of 1088 MW [92]. 
 
In summary, in this period the European PV market formation was strengthened [G-F5], especially in 
Germany, and entrepreneurial activity in the Chinese PV solar cell and polycrystalline silicon sectors [C-F1] 
increased dramatically. This was mainly as a result of knowledge import [C-F3] and learning by using the 
production technologies [C-F2], as well as increased global capital and human resources [G-F6] entering the 
PV manufacturing sector. In addition, entrepreneurial activities regarding PV machinery started to emerge 
[C-F1]. For this, local knowledge regarding PV technology was used instead of the imports of turn-key 
machines. Also, the legitimacy of PV [C-F7] increased, which induced strong support from local 
governments [C-F7], leading to the availability of more local resources [C-F6]. Along with the continuing 
strong demand from the European PV market [G-F5], the strong local supports in turn induced 
entrepreneurial activities in the PV manufacturing sector [C-F1]. Besides this virtuous cycle [C-F1], lobbying 
activities started for favorable policies to support a domestic market [C-F7] and this seems to have had 





Fig. 7. The main functional pattern of the Chinese PV innovation system in the period 2004-2008 
3.5. 2009-2012: The beginning of the formation of a domestic market for PV 
At the beginning of 2009, the effects of the global financial crisis became visible and the PV industry suffered 
severely [99]. At the same time, competition on the PV market became fierce and the price of PV started 
to drop. It became harder for Chinese entrepreneurs to remain profitable, and as a result Chinese 
entrepreneurs [C-F1] made an even greater effort to convince the Chinese government to invest in a 
domestic market [C-F7]. Traditionally, the lobby process is not very effective in China; however, due to the 
importance of this sector in economic turnover and employment, local governments joined forces with the 
entrepreneurs in the lobby. Moreover, this lobby can be associated with the Chinese central government’s 
macroeconomic policy, which responded to the global financial crisis with a stimulus package of 4,000 
billion CNY (about 585.6 billion USD) for 2009 and 2010, in order to increase public expenditure and thus 
stimulate domestic demand. As a result, this initially led to some market formation programs (the ‘Golden 
Sun Demonstration Program’ and the ‘Solar Building Program’) financed through the Special Renewable 
Energy Fund [C-F6] [102]. However, these subsidies were allocated based on installation capacity rather 
than generated output, which resulted in the strange phenomenon of Chinese PV manufacturers preferring 
to sell PV products of poorer quality to domestic projects in order to reduce inventories. This, in turn, 
caused a relatively low generating capacity of PV [67].  
 
Following the tremendous expansion of the Chinese PV manufacturing sector and the long-term support 
from both central and local government in the previous period, a negative regulation on PV manufacturers 
emerged in 2009 [C-F7]. After several years of rapid expansion of the polycrystalline silicon industry since 
2006, the Chinese CPG believed the production capacity of polycrystalline silicon to be excessive, with about 
80 thousand ton under construction. In addition, polycrystalline silicon started to be regarded as a product 
of high energy consumption and high pollution. Accordingly, the development of the polycrystalline silicon 
industry was restrained by the CPG, leading to less available capital and to restraining policies by local 
governments, and consequently the termination of some projects [C-F1] [67]. As a result, the growth rate 
of the production capacity and output of polycrystalline silicon has shown a clear reduction since 2010.  
 
While the polycrystalline silicon industry was facing restrictive measures, the manufacture of solar cells and 
modules was still able to acquire support from both central and local government. In 2009 and 2010, the 
China Development Bank (CDB), a policy bank, provided a line of credit of approximately 30 billion USD for 
Chinese solar cell and module manufacturers [C-F6]. Moreover, some local governments issued various 
refund policies to promote investment [C-F6] in new PV manufacturing plants [C-F1]. For example, the city 
of Huai’an provided refunds on loan interest, corporate income tax, and land transfer fees in addition to 
low electricity tariffs for local newly-established PV manufacturers [24]. 
 
In 2009, the 48th Research Institute of China Electronics Technology Group Corporation built twenty c-Si 
solar cell production lines for Chinese PV solar cell manufacturers [C-F1], which largely consisted of self-
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developed PV machinery [C-F2] [103]. Chinese PV machinery manufacturers obtained the technology 
competence for most special equipment in the turn-key production line of c-Si solar cell, with the exception 
of fully automatic printers and cutting apparatuses, and by 2009 occupied a reasonable share of the 
domestic market [104]. It also became clear that Chinese manufacturers of PV machinery were on the way 
to becoming serious competitors for foreign machinery manufacturers in the field of the c-Si solar cell 
machinery in which China specialized [85]. One of the interviewees, who worked as CTO in a major Chinese 
PV company, claimed that many PV manufacturers preferred to use domestic machinery, since most of the 
domestic machinery for c-Si solar cell performed as well as imported machinery but at a much lower price 
[73]. This increased competence resulted in a situation in which about 70% of new manufacturing machines 
used in Chinese PV c-Si solar cell manufacturing were now being made by Chinese manufacturers. However, 
the stability and reliability of some core Chinese PV machinery for c-Si solar cell was still lagging behind the 
advanced level of international machinery. In addition, the PV machineries and production line for thin film 
solar cells still depended mainly on import [60, 66, 67]. 
 
In 2010, the Chinese PV Industry Alliance was established, in which 22 PV manufacturers were involved [C-
F1]. This reinforced the lobby for policies favorable to PV [C-F7] [73, 105]. The target of the lobby was to 
introduce a specific domestic feed-in tariff for PV. In the same year, the renewable energy industry, including 
the PV manufacturing sector, became one of the seven Strategic Emerging Sectors (SES) [C-F7]. In fact, the 
seven SES were regarded as important forces of Chinese economic development in subsequent years [106]. 
Since 2010, PV has officially been regarded as a strategic necessity for China.  
 
In 2011, a feed-in tariff (FIT) for PV generation was finally established [C-F5], which was considered as a 
milestone for PV in China [107]. The grid-connected price of PV electricity was set at 1.15 CNY/KWh (about 
0.18 USD/KWh) for installations from before 2012 and 1 CNY/KWh (about 0.15 USD/KWh) for installations 
from 2012 [108]. Although the FIT for PV-generated electricity was lower than expected and the detailed 
rules and regulations remained vague, the announcement of the FIT still triggered a fast rise in PV 
installations in 2011(see Fig. 8), which was the fastest growth rate ever. However, this rapid growth in 2011 
may also have been induced by the price difference between projects completed before and after 2012. In 
2012, the growth rate of PV installations fell dramatically (see Fig. 8). The FIT seems to have had little impact 
on the Chinese PV manufacturing industry, since the production of solar cells continued to drop in these 
two years (see Fig. 6). 
 
 
Fig. 8. Chinese PV cell production output, Chinese PV-installed capacity and European PV-installed 
capacity from 2000 to 2012 (MWp) 




In the same year, in order to absorb the excessive production capacity, Chinese PV manufacturers started 
to explore emerging markets such as South America, South-East Asia and Africa, where 40 projects were 
commissioned [C-F1] [109]. Moreover, Chinese PV machinery manufacturers began exporting PV machinery 
to foreign PV manufacturers in 2010 [110], and made 100 million CNY (about 15.5 million USD) in exports 
from the total sales revenue of 4 billion CNY (about 0.6 billion USD) [104]. For example, the Jinglong Group 
exported a single crystal silicon furnace to an Uzbekistani PV manufacturer in 2011 [C-F1, C-F3] [111].  
 
Following the decline of the European PV market, the European Commission initiated anti-dumping 
proceedings against Chinese PV manufacturers in 2012, in order to protect their own PV manufacturing 
sector. These proceedings included PV panels and their key components. Up to then, this had been the 
largest trade litigation initiated by the EU against China, involving more than 20 billion USD [G-F5] [20]. 
Moreover, at the end of 2012, the US Department of Commerce imposed the anti-dumping and anti-subsidy 
duties on Chinese crystalline silicon PV cells and modules [112]. Aiming to take action in response to the 
investigation initialized by the USA, the ‘PV Generation Promotion Alliance’ was set up by several major 
Chinese PV manufacturers, including Suntech Power, Yingli Green Energy and Trina Solar. [C-F7][113]. In the 
same year, the annual European PV installation fell for the first time in a decade, resulting in no growth in 
China in 2012 for the PV cell production output (see Fig. 6) and the polycrystalline silicon production output 
[C-F1] [20, 112]. 
 
While the Chinese PV sector lost its legitimacy due to the foreign anti-dumping initiatives, the Chinese 
central government strengthened its support for Chinese PV by drafting three dedicated, nationwide 
documents. These documents covered almost all aspects of PV, including PV manufacturing, PV generation 
and PV technology [C-F7]. In fact, this was the first time that the PV industry and technology had been 
singled out for national documents, rather than just being included in documents on renewable energy. 
Moreover, the objectives became quite specific and ambitious. For example, until 2015 leading 
polycrystalline silicon manufacturers were to reach a production volume of five tons, leading solar cell 
manufacturers were to reach a production volume of five GW, and three to four PV machinery 
manufacturers were to earn an annual sales revenue of more than 1 billion CNY (about 0.2 billion USD) 
[104, 114].  
 
In summary, following the huge impact of the global financial crisis and the fierce competition on the 
international PV market, the Chinese PV manufacturing sector [C-F1], together with some local 
governments, tried hard to lobby for the formation of a domestic market [C-F7], and this led to the 
beginning of the formation of the Chinese PV market [C-F5]. However, the domestic PV market had little 
impact on the Chinese PV manufacturing sector [C-F1], since the domestic market was still very small 
compared to the export market. Export also became problematic due to trade litigations [G-F5], resulting 
in a sharp drop in the growth rate of Chinese PV output [C-F1]. In this period, in the supply chain of the 
Chinese PV manufacturing sector, different industries seemed to be heading in different directions. While 
the polycrystalline silicon industry [C-F1] began to be restrained by the central government [C-F7], the solar 
cell and module industries [C-F1] still enjoyed easy access to financial resources from central and local 
government [C-F6]. In the meantime, some PV machinery manufacturers started to export self-developed 
manufacturing equipment to other developing countries [C-F3], which may indicate the beginning of the 




Fig. 9. The functional pattern of the Chinese PV innovation system in the period 2009-20127   
 
Obviously, compared to foreign market size, current Chinese PV market is still at its infancy stage. However, 
there are signs in the domestic market indicating the gradual formation of a mature PV innovation system. 
Moreover, the rise of Chinese PV innovation system in the past decade, induced by explicit influences of 
external contextual factors on the Chinese PV TIS and strong internal dynamics, has also been validated by 
interview results. 
 
The effects of external contextual factors on Chinese PV TIS are twofold. On the one hand, four interviewees 
engaged in technology development (AT1, AT2, AT3, and AT4) highlight the essential role of turn-key 
production lines from western countries, especially Germany, which significantly facilitated the production 
of PV modules. On the other hand, most interviewees (AT1, AT2, AT3, AP2, and E1) view the rapid growth 
of PV market in Europe as the most important cause for large-scale expansion of Chinese manufacturing 
capacity of PV products in a short period. 
 
As regard to the internal dynamics in Chinese PV TIS, interviewees AT1, AT2, AT4, and E1 all mention that 
the accumulation of technological competence as a key factor that explains the rise of Chinese PV industry. 
However, universities and research institutes do not play a key role since their interaction with the industry 
is every limited (AT1, AT2, AT3, AP1, and E1). Moreover, the important role of local governments is 
recognized by interviewees AT1, AP1, AP3, and E1. In pursuit of rapid economic growth and local 
employment, local governments compete to provide favorable policies for PV manufacturers, such as easy 
access to financial capital, low-cost land use, and low cost electricity supply. This strong local support, 
induced by a strong national policy program, have attracted many entrepreneurs to enter into PV industry. 
Finally, two interviewees (AP2 and E1) highlight that the Chinese PV advocacy coalition has become much 
more influential when PV industry has become more mature. This led to increasingly favorable institutional 
conditions. 
4. Analysis and conclusions 
The story of the success of China’s PV industry on the global market started as early as 1980s, although the 
real acceleration did not occur until 2004. The industrialization process of the PV industry and the 
                                                             
7 In this figure, dotted lines linked between functions refer to negative effect. 
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establishment of global dominance took place in less than 10 years. 
 
Three factors external to the Chinese PV TIS were of crucial importance. Firstly, China changed its economic 
policy and permitted private enterprise [C-F1] and, related to this, the country became a WTO member. 
Secondly, the technology transfer from western countries to China was substantial, and Germany played an 
important role in this [C-F2, G-F3]. In search of a large market for their products, western firms helped the 
Chinese install PV installations and enhance their competences. Moreover, these firms delivered turn-key 
production lines. Thirdly, the large European market [G-F5] for PV in combination with the availability of 
turn-key production lines [C-F2] triggered Chinese entrepreneurs to enter this new industry. The turn-key 
production lines are a typical feature of this innovation system. Only modest technological competences 
are needed to run a PV factory. The high-tech capabilities and knowledge are embedded in the production 
lines and can therefore easily be transferred. It is the late entrance of China into the PV sector that helped 
make these types of dynamics possible. As a result of this late entrance, well-working turn-key production 
lines were available.  
 
In addition to these external factors, there are strong internal dynamics in the Chinese PV TIS that explain 
the rapid growth of the sector. Entrepreneurs entered the innovation system because of the high 
expectations of profitable business opportunities. However, it was the Chinese central government that in 
several policy plans highlighted the importance of renewable energy for the long-term future of China. In 
this way, activities in the PV sector were legitimized and local governments used this legitimacy to facilitate 
PV entrepreneurs with cheap capital, land, and institutional advantages, which in turn led to more 
entrepreneurs entering the innovation system. In the meantime, technological competence was also 
acquired by means of investment in R&D, but due to the weak connection between knowledge 
organizations (universities and research institutes) and PV manufacturers, for a long time most of the 
technology was imported from abroad. While the central government highlighted the importance of PV in 
terms of climate and energy security, local governments mainly saw PV as an industrial opportunity and a 
way to increase local employment and tax revenues.  
 
In addition, even though Chinese PV solar cell manufacturers preferred to import turn-key technology from 
abroad, the development of technological competence also played an important role in the rise of the 
Chinese PV industry, and this is reflected particularly in the rise of Chinese manufacturing of PV machinery 
for c-Si solar cells. The development of PV machinery involved high-tech capabilities and knowledge that 
for many years had been monopolized by a few western manufacturers of PV machinery. In this context, it 
is remarkable that several Chinese traditional machinery manufacturers managed to turn to PV and develop 
and produce various PV manufacturing modules, mainly in the field of c-Si solar cells and, furthermore, at 
a far lower price.  
 
With the rapid rise of the Chinese PV manufacturing sector, it is the domestic market for PV that is the 
missing link which makes the PV innovation system complete. The small size of the domestic market is 
mainly due to the weak lobby network around PV, which is believed to be a common institutional problem 
in China. Moreover, the export-oriented focus did not help to create a strong Chinese PV innovation system. 
However, in recent years local governments have started to join the lobby network. This seems to be 
successful, and has led to the beginning of a Chinese PV market with the implementation of an FIT scheme. 
 
Therefore, in approximately 10 years, as a late entrant, the Chinese PV manufacturing sector has managed 
not only to catch up, but also to become the world leader in the PV industry. Considering the increasing 
importance of this sector for the Chinese economy, the Chinese PV industry has gradually become one of 
the pillars of the Chinese manufacturing sector. Especially because of its high-tech capabilities and its great 
contribution to local employment and tax revenue, the PV industry seems to be receiving more attention 
from the Chinese central and local government.  
 
In terms of theory development, this paper has shown that it is highly useful to explicitly take different 
context factors into account, echoing recent calls for conceptualizing contextual structures and interaction 
dynamics by the major transitions scholars [33, 115, 116]. In this paper, we have simplified both the context 
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of the Chinese PV innovation system to Chinese industrial policy in general and the influence of the global 
PV TIS. Although this may be a simplification, we believe it sheds sufficient light on important interaction 
mechanisms and offers sufficient explanations for the development of this industry.  
 
While this study has attempted to thoroughly uncover the interactions between the Chinese PV innovation 
system and some context systems in the innovation trajectory of PV in China, it has some limitations that 
can be improved by further research. Firstly, the role of local factors in the innovation and transitions 
process has been highlighted in this study but we did not specify the link with existing actor structures. A 
recent study argued that TIS actors, networks and institutions are embedded in structures that pre-exist in 
a specific territory, and the local embeddedness has impact on the formation of an innovation system [33]. 
This spatial orientation is important since it may explain why industrial clusters emerge and develop in one 
city or region but not in another; and how to identify the spatially differential routes of transitions in a 
specific territory. Secondly, this research is unable to emphasize the interactions between TIS and relevant 
neighboring sectors. In this study, we observed that entrepreneurs moved into the PV industry from related 
sectors, however, a thorough analysis of the impact of related sectors on a focal innovation system is still 
lacking.  
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Appendix A.  List of Interviews 
Table A1 
List of interviews that have been carried out 
Symbol  Type  Institute  Nationality Interview information 
AT1 Academics at 
technology 
Shanghai Jiao Tong 
University  
China 2014.01.26, 43’, by phone 
AT2 Academics at 
technology 
Chinese Academy of 
Sciences  
China 2014.01.27, 32’, by phone 
AT3 Academics at 
technology 
Nankai University China 2014.01.29, 47’, by phone 
AT4 Academics at 
technology 
Utrecht University the Netherlands  2014.01.29, 37’, face to face 
AP1 Academics at 
policy  
Chinese Academy of 
Sciences 
China 2014.03.10, by email 
AP2 Academics at 
policy 
North China Electric 
Power University 
China 2014.03.13, 28’, by phone 
AP3 Academics at 
policy 
Tsinghua University China 2014.03.17, 27’, by phone 
E1 Entrepreneur 
(CTO) 
anonymous  China 2014.03.14, 44’, by phone 
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